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ABSTRACT 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are networked 
control systems used in many critical infrastructure areas such as power water 
and transportation. Many of these systems continue to use legacy field devices 
that lack cyber security features. The field device security preprocessor is a 
bump-in-the-wire security solution of legacy field devices. This thesis describes 
the design and analysis of a dual Bloom filter structure for use in a field device 
security preprocessor. A dual Bloom filter is a variant of the traditional Bloom 
filter, that performs role based access checks in O(1) time. It is shown this 
structure, which can produce false authentications is shown to be acceptable for 
this security use thought analysis and penetration testing.  Analysis and testing 
shows that in spite of false positives this structure can provide the required level 
of security, while maintaining the required level of performance on low cost 
hardware.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis describes the design, development and testing of a field device 
security preprocessor for role based access control and challenge response using 
dual Bloom filters. The development of this device comes out of a need 
previously found and described by Hieb and Graham [1] in their research at the 
University of Louisville in the intelligent systems research lab (ISRL).  
1.1. Background and Motivation 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are at the heart of 
the critical infrastructure that includes the power grid and water treatment 
facilities. For a variety of reasons industrial control systems (ICS) have depended 
on “security by obscurity,” however, in recent years these systems have become 
increasingly vulnerable to cyber security attacks. The Stuxnet virus discovered in 
June 2010 [2] is an excellent recent example of the thread to ICS. Vendors, 
operators, and the government are now aware of the need to protect ICS from 
cyber based attacks [3]. It has become obvious that this method of security is no 
longer enough. Protecting these systems has fallen to traditional network 
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security techniques such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS), 
however, ICS have differences from traditional networks that require uniquely 
tailored solutions, protecting field devices is an example of this. 
Protection at the field device level is necessary to ensure that these systems 
are not compromised or damaged, while operability and performance is 
maintained. Upgrading these systems directly to include the necessary security 
features such as access control, authentication, and integrity is not an option for 
most of the devices. SCADA field devices have long lifetimes typically measured 
in decades, these older devices do not have the processing power or memory to 
efficiently implement these security enhancements. Also due to the large number 
of different field devices, implementation of such security onto all of these legacy 
devices would be an unfeasible task.    
1.2. Designing For Security, Designing for Feasibility  
When thinking about a solution for security of these legacy SCADA field 
devices it is important to consider the feasibility in terms of cost and 
performance design requirements. Designing a system that has low cost typically 
means the hardware will be low performance as well; this means it is important 
to implement software that is efficient, minimal and secure. A solution that 
creates a large amount of overhead and time delay may cause performance 
issues in these critical systems, and any practical security solution must provide 
security enhancements within the time constraints of these systems.  
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 Hieb and Graham[1] have recently proposed a field device security pre-
processor (FD-SPP) using a microkernel based security architecture [4] and built 
on low cost commercially available hardware running. The effectiveness of the 
FD-SPP will eventually be measured using verification test, but current work is 
focused on a functional prototype implemented on low cost hardware. Selection 
of an operating system will play role in verification, without a verified operating 
system software running on the FD-SPP cannot be verified.  
It is obvious that typical operating systems such as Linux or Windows, 
which contains several million lines of code are too large to be completely 
verified. Exploits in these operating systems are often found by attackers and 
require updates to patch these exploits. It is important to select an operating 
system that does require this frequent updating and has a kernel that can be 
trusted as bug free. For this reason, further discussed in Chapter 4, a micro-
kernel based operating system called OKL4 was selected to serve as the 
operating system for this project. 
Another important consideration in the design of the FD-SPP is a low foot-
print in terms of overhead and performance impact on the ICS. Role based 
access control and authentication have been indicated by prior research as 
necessary security enhancements to SCADA devices[5]. The implementation of 
these is often costly in terms of computation time. Using a low foot print micro-
kernel will help keep computation costs down, but it is important to implement 
these security features as efficiently as possible. Previous work at the University 
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of Louisville by Brad Luyster worked to implement role based access control on a 
low footprint microkernel[6], this work aims to create an alternative method of 
role based access control with a low enough foot print to be implemented in 
SCADA systems.  In order to achieve this, this thesis explores a variation on 
Bloom Filters (discussed in Chapter 2) to efficiently implement role based access 
control (RBAC) and make decisions on when to challenge ICS messages. This 
data structure also reduces the amount of space required by the RBAC lookup 
table. This data structure performs lookups in a time independent of the number 
of entries of the table allowing quick lookups for any number of entries. The low 
foot print created by this data structure in terms of storage allows it to be easily 
implemented on low cost hardware.  
1.3. Organization  
The second chapter of this Thesis provides a literature review and 
description of the data structure that is at the heart of the security feature 
implementation of this project, the Bloom filter. Chapter three describes the 
design of the security features for the FD-SPP using a Bloom filter as well as the 
required modifications needed to a SCADA communication protocol for these 
features to be utilized. The fourth chapter describes the implementation of a 
prototype field device security preprocessor (FD-SPP) for the purposes of initial 
evaluation of the dual Bloom filter structure. The fifth chapter describes the 
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testing of the FD-SPP in a simple SCADA network. Conclusions and directions for 
future work are presented in the sixth and final chapter.  
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2. INTRODUCTION TO BLOOM FILTERS 
 A Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure proposed by Burton 
H. Bloom in 1970. In the original paper[7], he proposed an alternative hash-
coding technique which traded of a small amount of allowable error for a 
performance increase in both time and space. This hash-coding technique is now 
known as a Bloom Filter and is commonly used in a wide variety of applications.  
A Bloom filter is used to determine whether or not a particular item is a 
member of a given set. When the Bloom filter is queried with respect to a given 
member, the Bloom filter always returns true if the member of the set, however 
if the queried value is not a member of the set, the Bloom filter will not always 
return false. The rate at which the Bloom filter returns true for elements not in 
the set is known as the false positive rate of the structure. A theoretical Bloom 
Filter does not have any false negatives.  
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2.1. Properties of Bloom Filters 
The basic structure of a Bloom filter consists of a bit array of length m. All of 
the bits of this array are initially set to 0, which represents an empty Bloom filter. 
In order to add an item to the Bloom filter, the item is passed through k hash 
functions, each producing a different value, ak (         ), which 
represents one of the 1-m bits of the Bloom filter such that a1 ≠ a2 ≠ … ≠ ak-1 ≠ 
ak. The bit corresponding to each of these values is then set to 1. To check an 
entry, the entry is passed through the same k hash functions to produce a list of 
bit addresses. Each of the bit addresses are then checked in the filter’s bit array; 
if all addresses have a 1, then the entry is said to be a member of the set 
represented by the Bloom filter [7]. Because different items may have bit 
address collisions false positives are possible, but unlikely, when an item not in 
the set has a hash address that has been set to 1 by adding multiple members to 
the filter. Because given entries are selected based on whether the addresses 
deemed by each of the hash functions given the particular entry are set to 1.  
The time of the insertion is depends only on the k hash functions and is 
independent of both the size in bits of the filter, m, and the number of elements 
inserted, n. The insertion takes      time for each item [7].  
Shown in Figure 2.1.1 are two elements A and B being added to the Bloom 
filter. 
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FIGURE 2.1.1 - Adding elements A and B to a Bloom Filter 
To be added to the Bloom filter, the elements A and B are each passed 
through five hash functions (k=5) to produce five bit address in the Bloom filter. 
These bit values are then all set to 1. Additional items are inserted into the 
Bloom filter in the same way. Given a filter, checking if A and B are member is 
done similar to insertion; the values are passed once again through the hash 
functions to produce five bit address which are each checked in the filter; if 
every bit address is equal to 1, then the item is said to be in the set represented 
by the Bloom filter. The time of a membership check is also only dependent on 
the k hash functions and is independent of both the size in bits of the filter, m, 
and the number of elements stored in the filter, n. The membership check also 
takes      time [7]. Figure 2.1.2 shows the checking of two new elements, C 
and D are in the filter. Neither C nor D is a member of the set that is represented 
by the filter BF. D is determined not to be in the set, but C is a false positive.  
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FIGURE 2.1.2 - Determining if C and D are in the set 
 
In order to check if each of these values are in the filter, they are each 
passed through the five hash functions to generate corresponding bit addresses 
for C and D. When checking D, it is apparent that D is not a member of the set 
because not all the bit addresses contain 1’s. According ti the filter, C is a 
member of the set because all the values from its hash functions are 1. Since C 
was not added to the set and it is not a true member of the set, this is a false 
positive. That Bloom filters have false positive rates is one of their limitations.   
Since each of the hash functions should produce the address bits 
uniformly, the odds of any particular entry being a false positive is a function of 
the number of bits that are set to 1 and the size of the Bloom filter. After a given 
number of entries “n” have been added to the Bloom filter, the probability that a 
particular bit address is still 0 is give in equation 2.1.1.  
 
   (  
 
 
)
 
       
(2.1.1) 
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Using the probability of each bit being set to 1, the false positive rate of 
the Bloom filter can be calculated. Using this probability, an estimate of the 
number of entries that are set to 1 can be calculated using equation 2.1.2. 
 
                                 (2.1.2) 
 
This is important because it shows that the probability of an entry being falsely 
accepted is exponentially related to the number of bits set to 1’s over the total 
number of bits, m. Since each bit is distinct, the probability of the bit at the 
second bit address being a 1 is slightly less than the probability the bit at the first 
bit address was since there is one less 1 and one less bit to select. The 
probability the bit at the first address is a 1 can be calculated using equation 
2.1.3. 
 
     
       
 
      
(2.1.3) 
 
The probability the bit at the second address is a 1 assuming the first address 
contains a 1 is calculated using equation 2.1.4. 
 
     
           
   
 
(2.1.4) 
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This trend continues for additional bit addresses for all of the k hash functions 
and the probability of the ith address containing a 1 assuming all the addresses 1 
through i-1 contain a 1 can be calculated using equation 2.1.5. 
 
 
     
               
       
 
(2.1.5) 
 
For a given filter the false positive rate of the filter can be calculated as simply 
the product of all the probabilities of each of the bit addresses defined by the k 
hash functions. The formula to calculate the false positive rate (pb) for any given 
Bloom filter is shown in equation 2.1.6. 
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(2.1.6) 
 
For very large values of m such that m >> k, which is the case for Bloom filters 
which desire a low false positive rate, this equation can be shown to have a 
much simpler form as shown in equation 2.1.7. 
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(2.1.7) 
 
2.2. The Random Filter 
Implementing a Bloom filter presents some specific challenges. 
Theoretically, a Bloom filter creates a data structure which will encodes a data 
set into a small data structure, set membership can be checked very quickly, but 
requires sacrificing a small amount of allowable error but when it comes to 
implementation. The properties of the Bloom filter discussed in section 2.1 are 
theoretical. The problem with implementation is with the hash functions; 
specifically identifying hash functions that produce k uniformly distributed distinct 
values from k hash functions [8]. In fact, most implementations of Bloom filters 
are not true Bloom filters, but a very similar data structure called a Random Filter 
[8]. 
A random filter is an adaption of the original Bloom filter proposed in 1998 
by Wang, Yang and Tseug [8]. Unlike the Bloom filter, the random filter has hash 
functions that are completely independent of each other and are a permitted to 
produce the same output with any given key. Thus, in order to add an item to a 
random filter, the item will be passed through k hash functions, each producing a 
value ak such that           [8]. This produces a different false positive rate 
than the original Bloom filter, but is much easier to implement. All the other 
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properties of the random filter are the same as the Bloom filter. Like the Bloom 
filter, the false positive rate of the random filter is related to the number of bits 
set to 1 in the random filter. After n entries into the random filter, the probability 
that a particular bit is still sit to 0 is given in equation 2.2.1. 
 
   (  
 
 
)
  
 
(2.2.1) 
 
Since each of the hash functions produces a value that is independent and also 
uniformly distributed from 0 to m-1, the false positive rate of a random filter can 
be calculated using equation 2.2.2.  
 
    (  (  
 
 
)
  
)
 
 [8] 
(2.2.2) 
 
Besides being easier to implement, the random filter has another advantage over 
the Bloom filter: its false positive rate is less than that of the Bloom filter. 
Assuming                :  
 
    (  (  
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)
 
)
 
   
 
Proof, derived by [8] is given in Appendix A 
(2.2.3) 
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This being shown, it is obvious that the random Filter is the better choice 
for implementation. Numerical implementations of these two filters also show 
that the random filter offers a slightly lower false positive rate than the Bloom 
filter [8]. More important than having a lower false positive rate is the ability to 
build it using independent hash functions. In computing literature, the random 
filter is often referred to as a Bloom filter and the false positive rates shown for 
Bloom filters are often those of the random filter. In order to adhere to common 
practice, the random filter will be referred to a Bloom filter for the remainder of 
this document, and all references to a Bloom filter unless specified can be 
assumed to be implemented as a random filter and not as originally proposed by 
Bloom in 1970.  
2.3. Parameter Selection for building a Bloom Filter 
The Bloom filter sacrifices a small false positive rate in exchange for both 
a small time and space constraint. For example, no matter how many elements 
are added to a Bloom filter it always stays the same size, and no matter how 
many elements are added to the filter both insertions and membership checks 
will always take the same amount of time. However, if too many items are added 
to the Bloom filter, its false positive rate will increase and eventually become 
100%. So even though the space required for a Bloom filter is usually small 
relative to the actual data stored in it, it is important to make the Bloom filter 
large enough so that once all the elements are added the false positive rate is 
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sufficiently low. In order to achieve this, the optimal values for m and k can be 
found given a desired false positive rate and the number of elements n that will 
be inserted into the set. As with most optimization problems, the location of the 
optimal values are found using a first derivative; however, the derivative of the 
false positive formula for the Bloom filter is one that is not particularly easy to 
solve. For this reason, an approximation of the false positive rate formula can be 
used. 
 
   (  (  
 
 
)
  
)
 
 (   
   
 )
 
      [9] 
(2.3.1) 
 
The properties of Bloom filters are well known and taking the derivative with 
respect to k and solving for k gives the well-known relationship between the 
optimal k and m and n. 
   
       
 
  [9] (2.3.2) 
 
This equation can be plugged into the approximated false positive rate and 
solved for m, which allows for the size of the Bloom filter to be determined given 
a particular number of entries and false positive rate. However, this value like 
the value for k cannot be used exactly because they most both be natural 
numbers.  
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(2.3.3) 
 
This value in turn can be plugged back in to the optimal k equation so that the 
optimal number of hash functions can be found. This value as well must be 
turned into an natural number since it is not possible to have a non-natural 
number of hash functions. These formulas can still give a good estimate around 
the values for m and k, and then natural values can be checked into the false 
positive rate formula to find the one that produces the lowest rate. It is also 
important to note that the false positive rate returned by this function as well is 
merely an approximation. The actual false positive rate of the Bloom Filter 
requires the knowing the exact percentage of bits that are set to 1 to the size of 
the filter, which can only be found by building the Bloom filter. Different data 
sets will produce different number of 1’s due to different collisions among the 
hash functions even for the same number of entries [10], but all of these rates 
will be fairly close (at least same order of magnitude) to the approximated false 
positive rate. Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 show a comparison of false positive rates 
and percent difference from the theoretical false positive rate for two different 
data sets of size n=100, to several different Bloom filters. All Bloom filters use 
the same number of hash functions k=4. These two figures show that adding 
different values or using different hash functions each produce different false 
positive rates. More discussion on these differing false positive rates can be 
found in section 4.7. 
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FIGURE 2.3.1 Comparison of False Positive Rate for two different data sets 
  
 
FIGURE 2.3.2 Comparison of Percent Difference from Theoretical False Positive 
Rate for two different data sets 
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2.4. Applications of Bloom Filters 
Bloom filters are used in a large variety of applications, from networking 
applications like packet routing, to spell checkers, to helping with safe browsing.  
Spell checking is one of the most classic and historic use of a Bloom filter and 
were even used in early UNIX systems [11]. In these early computing systems, 
space was a scarce resource and using a Bloom filter allowed for a very compact 
data structure. Unlike most data structures, Bloom filters often can be stored in 
smaller spaces than the list could be. For example, a Bloom filter-based spell 
checker can store its dictionary in a much smaller space than the dictionary itself. 
An example Bloom filter was created for over 80,000 words, which took up over 
680kb of disk space. Creating a bloom filter with a false positive rate of      
     % only takes around 520kb of space [12]. Similar to the spell checkers, 
Bloom filters have been proposed to store unsuitable passwords in security 
systems [11]. Basically the same concept that was used for spell checkers could 
be used to reject weak passwords [13]; add all the weak passwords to a Bloom 
filter, then when the user selects a password, it can be quickly rejected if it is in 
the weak password filter. Additionally, a false positive here and there really does 
not matter in this application since it will merely require the user to select a 
different password. This means a large dataset can be highly compressed using a 
Bloom Filter-based approach for this application. Also, the speed of a Bloom filter 
for any large dataset will mostly likely be faster than any look up for these large 
dictionaries.  
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More recently, networking applications have begun to use Bloom filters for 
a wide variety of topics. These applications include collaborating in overlay and 
peer-to-peer networks, resource routing, packet routing, measurement, and 
more [11]. Many network uses of Bloom filters involve the reduction of network 
traffic. For example, assume User A wants to send a large number of files to 
User B, but User B already has some of these files. Since sending all the files 
would waste network traffic, Bloom filters can be used to determine which files 
to send. Both user A and user B create Bloom filters for their file list, and user B 
sends their Bloom filter to user A. user A can then easily find the intersection of 
the two Bloom filters by performing a bitwise AND. Entries that are not in this 
new intersection filter are the files that need to be sent to User B. Because the 
Bloom filter may have false positives, not all the files in the original list may be 
sent. However, if this setting is used a distributed peer to peer system where the 
user is getting files from multiple agents to increase download time, the 
redundancy of the multiple users should allow for all the files to be transferred in 
most cases [11].  
Google Chrome also uses Bloom filters in its safe surf features. According 
to Google®, Chrome downloads a list of sites that have been known to contain 
malware or are known to engage in phishing.  
“To save space and to avoid giving out URLs to malware and phishing 
websites, the lists contain enough information in most cases to verify that if 
a site is phishing or malware, but does not contain enough information to 
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definitively say if the site phishing or malware. If the URL of the site you're 
on matches anything in the list, your browser will contact Google’s servers 
for more information to make a decision. Your browser sends information 
that does not let Google uniquely determine what site you are visiting (for 
the technically savvy, the first 32 bits of a SHA-256 hash of the URL is sent). 
If your computer then decides that you’re visiting a risky site, it can warn 
you about it.” – Google Chrome Help [14]  
 
Looking into the source of the chromium.org project [15], which is used 
for both the Google Chrome web browser and the Chromium OS, reveals the use 
of Bloom filters for the client side safe search check. In order to perform a site 
check, the requested URL is stripped down to its base and checked into a Bloom 
filter which contains a list of all the known URL’s which are associated with 
malware and phishing sites. If the checked site is in the Bloom filter, then a hash 
is sent to Google’s safe browsing service to verify that the site is indeed a known 
malicious site and not a false positive [14], [15].  The use of a Bloom filter 
serves multiple purposes for the Google Chrome safe search. For one, it is much 
smaller and faster than any type of lookup table that Google could provide with 
Chrome. Secondly, it allows checks to be performed client side, without 
distributing Google’s list of malicious URLs since there is no way to get the 
elements of the set back out of a Bloom filter. The speed at which the Bloom 
filter can make checks also makes these checks unnoticed to the user since 
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network queries are only needed when a malicious site is visited or the 
occasional false positive. Avoiding these network queries improves the speed for 
the general user as well as reducing the load on Google’s servers. This novel 
application of Bloom filter’s shows how useful these data structures can be in 
situations where a small false positive rate can be traded-off for space and time. 
2.5. A Bloom Filter for Role Based Access Control 
Role based access control (RBAC) makes extensive use of sets, and set 
membership checks. Bloom filters can be used to implement a role based access 
control efficiently. An implementation of role based access was previously 
created by Tripuitara and Carbunar that used a modified Bloom filter known as a 
cascading Bloom filter as the primary role based access control mechanism [16].  
To use a Bloom filter for RBAC, a list of the entire set of <role, operation> 
pairs must first be added to the Bloom filter. Adding a <role, operation> pair to 
a Bloom filter is the same as adding any other data object to the Bloom filter. 
The role and operation are combined into a single byte array, which is then 
passed through the ‘k’-hash functions. The bits in the Bloom filter indicated by 
the hashes are set to “1” and the <role, operation> pair is inserted in the Bloom 
filter. Checks are done in the same way as a traditional Bloom filter check, using 
the same hash functions to identify bit locations check the bits for 1s in the filter. 
Using a Bloom Filter for access control has its draw backs due to the false 
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positive rate property of the Bloom filter however it will be argued in this paper 
that the tradeoff for their speed can be worth the cost.  
2.6. Variations and Extensions of Bloom Filters 
The structure of the Bloom filter allows new data to be added but 
disallows the removal of any items because removal could create false negatives. 
If all of the 1’s associated with any of the entries into the Bloom filter were 
removed, collisions that it shared with other entries could be removed as well, 
which creates false negatives for those entries. One of the simplest extensions of 
the Bloom filter, known as the counting Bloom filter[9], allows for data to be 
removed from the filter.  The difference between a Bloom filter and a counting 
Bloom filter is when an entry is added, each hash function output corresponds to 
a counter instead of a single bit. Each of the counters at the positions selected 
by the hash functions is incremented during an insert, and decremented during a 
removal [9]. Also, though this certainly helps the false negative problem, it does 
not completely eliminate it, since these counters must have a finite maximum 
and will eventually become full. For example, if a counting Bloom filter has 
counters that go from 0-3, once a counter has four entries, the value of the 
counter will be 3. When three of the values are removed, the fourth will become 
a false negative. However, if the counter is large enough, it is unlikely that this 
will occur, and for some applications this low false negative rate may be 
acceptable.  
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Several expansions on the counting Bloom filter have been made to use 
Bloom filters with streaming data. Generally these streaming data counting 
Bloom filters decrement the counters periodically or based special functions to 
prevent the counting Bloom filter from filling and only show recent or specific 
trends in the data. One such expansion called the time-decaying Bloom filter 
uses counters that delay exponentially, which can be used to detect items that 
occur frequently in the data stream [17]. 
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3. A DUAL BLOOM FILTER STRUCTURE FOR EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL AND CHALLENGE RESPONSE FOR A FIELD 
DEVICE SECURITY PRE-PROCESSOR 
3.1. The Need for a SCADA Field Device Security Pre-Processor 
Industrial control systems have a number of known security vulnerabilities, 
and a large number of legacy control systems may no security in some places at 
the control system level. Some recent incidents such as the 2006 hacker attack 
on a water treatment plant Harrisburg, PA [4] has highlighted the significance of 
the cyber threat created by the lack of security in some of the most critical 
systems to the nation [4]. Legacy devices are one of the most significant of 
these vulnerabilities. Due to the long life times and high replacement cost of 
these legacy devices it is desirable to create a bolt-on appliance that can add 
security to these legacy devices with minimal cost and performance impact. 
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3.2. Access Control and Challenge Response in SCADA networks 
 The Implementation of a Security Pre-processer for SCADA security 
requires a protocol that allows for the implementation of such security. Modbus 
is an open and simple protocol commonly used in SCADA networks and 
commonly found being used by legacy field devices [18]. Modbus, by default 
does not offer any type of mechanisms for role based access control or for 
challenge response.  
 The basic structure of a Modbus message includes the address of the 
device the packet is intended for, a function code to tell the device what to do, a 
series of data bytes, and error detection bytes which are determined used cyclic 
redundancy check (CRC) algorithms [19].   
ADDRESS FUNCTION CODE DATA  CRC  
FIGURE 3.2.1 - Typical elements of a Modbus message 
 
Function codes are predefined and specified in the Modbus protocol [19].  
Typical function codes include read and write coils and read and write registers.  
A sample Modbus exchange is shown in FIGURE 3.2.2.  
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MTU RTU
Modbus Command
Modbus Response
 
FIGURE 3.2.2 - Standard Modbus exchange 
 
In order to allow for Modbus to support role based access control and 
challenge response a couple of small additions have to be made to the Modbus 
Protocol[4], [5]. The modified Modbus protocol will be referred to Extended-
Modbus when differentiation between it and the original protocol is necessary. 
The first required extension to Modbus is to add the concept of a user, and a 
user’s secret. This user needs to authenticate (initially and periodically) when 
communicating with the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) or legacy field device. In 
order to support users the extended Modbus protocol includes a new function 
code, Request Connection, which includes a user ID in the data field to establish 
a connection, and allows the access control system to know which user is logging 
in. To verify that the user is the user specified in the login request an additional 
packet must be added. Extended-Modbus has a second new function code, 
Challenge. The HMI side of the system replies to this Extended-Modbus packet 
with a third new packet type with a new function code, Response. Keeping in 
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tradition with typical Modbus protocol standards the request connection packet 
will be returned to the MTU upon a successful connection.  
MTU RTU
Request Connection
Challenge
Response
Request Connection
 
FIGURE 3.2.3 - Extended Modbus Connection Request 
 
3.2.1. Details of the Extended Modbus Function Codes 
Modbus has a large number of unused function codes which allowed the 
protocol to be expanded very simply. Shown in Table TABLE 3.2.1 are the 
function codes for the new commands that were added to the protocol. 
TABLE 3.2.1 Extended Modbus Function Codes 
Function Code Description 
40 Connection Request 
41 Challenge 
42 Challenge Response 
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The connection request packet was added as function code 40. This 
packet is responsible for sending the user id to the field device. Each user will 
have a unique user id which is used by the field device to identify them and look 
up their role and their secret. A connection request packet is always challenged 
by the field device. The successful completion of this challenge means that the 
user has successfully logged in and all packets that are challenged will be 
checked with that user’s secret for the duration of the users session. The issue of 
a new login request automatically ends the previous user’s session. Multiple 
users accessing the device at the same time is not supported at this time. 
 
Byte 1 2 3 4-5 
Data ADDRESS 40 USER ID CRC 
FIGURE 3.2.4 - Packet Structure for Connection Request 
 
The challenge packet is sent from the field device when a packet needs to 
be challenged or a user is logging in. This packet contains four 4 bytes of 
cryptographic nonce to be used as part of the hash for the response packet. 
Byte 1 2 3-6 7-8 
Data ADDRESS 41 NONCE CRC 
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FIGURE 3.2.5 - Packet Structure for Challenge Packet 
 
The challenge response packet is sent from the MTU/HMI as a response 
to receiving a challenge from the field device. This packet contains a hash of the 
original packet, the cryptographic nonce from the challenge, and the user’s 
secret. Construction of this packet is explained more later in Chapter IV.  
3.3. Dual Bloom Filters for Modbus Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
The role based access control in this project is similar to the one 
mentioned previously in Section 2.5 in the fact that it uses a Bloom filter for 
access control by hashing <role, operation> pairs but the Bloom filter 
implementation and use is quite different. The RBAC for this project not only 
determines whether the packet is allowed, i.e. a user performing an allowed 
operation, but also determines whether that packet is critical and therefore 
requires a challenge to support integrity and authenticity. In order to achieve this 
extra feature the RBAC system uses dual Bloom filters. The Bloom filters have 
the exact same number of bits and use the exact same hash functions. When an 
entry is to be checked in the RBAC it only has to be passed through the k hash 
functions and then it can be checked in both the Bloom filters. The cost of using 
two Bloom filters instead of one in terms of computation time is nominal and 
results in an access check in O(k). The cost of using the two Bloom filters in 
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space is double the cost of use a single Bloom filter since the Bloom filters will 
each take up m bits.  
Both of the Bloom filters contain <role, operation> pairs, where each 
operation is a Modbus packet. The first Bloom filter contains all the allowable 
<role, operation> pairs and is responsible for determining if the packet should 
be allowed or rejected.  The second Bloom filter determines whether the packet 
should be challenged. This second filter could contain either all the packets that 
need to be challenged or all the packets that do not, a comparison of these 
techniques can be found in section 3.5. For now assume the challenge Bloom 
filter contains all the entries that are challenged. In this case the following table 
illustrates, whether to allow the packet, challenge the packet, or reject the 
packet.   
TABLE 3.3.1 – Dual Bloom Filter RBAC 
Access Bloom Filter  Challenge Bloom Filter  
Yes Yes Challenge 
Yes No Allow 
No Yes Reject 
No No Reject 
 
Operations that are allowed are performed immediately after the packet is 
received; challenged operations are performed only after a successful challenge 
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response is received. Operations that are rejected are ignored without are type 
of response. Since the access Bloom filter contains all the packets that can be 
accepted (Set A), and the challenge Bloom filter contains all the packets that can 
be accepted and must be challenged (Set C) if the packet is not in the access 
Bloom filter it will not be in the challenge Bloom filter. 
                      (3.3.1) 
 
Figure 3.3.1 shows how the dual Bloom filter RBAC is used to process 
Modbus messages, and determine whether to challenge, allow, or reject each 
packet.  
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Bloom Filter Check Loop
Check Access Bloom Filter
Check Requires Challenge Bloom Filter
Get Bit Position From Hash
[index less than K] 
Set ret to Challenge Required
Return Packet Not Valid
[no] 
set ret to Allow Packet Passthrough
[no] 
Increment Index
Return ret
Hash <Role, Operation> using Hash k
[yes] 
 
FIGURE 3.3.1 - Dual Bloom Filter RBAC Check 
 
3.4. Creation and Analysis of an Example Dual Bloom Filter 
The first step to creating a Bloom filter is determining the number of bits 
required m, and the number of hash functions required k.  These two numbers 
can be based on the estimated number of objects that will be added to the 
bloom filter and a desired false positive rate. From the properties of the Bloom 
filters these two values can be easily calculated using the well-known formulas 
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described in section 2.2 using the estimated number of entries that will be 
added, n, and the desired false positive rate, p. For this example, let n = 100, 
and p = .01. Using the following formula an optimal value for m can be derived. 
 
   
      
      
  
          
      
        
(3.4.1) 
 
In order to make the code simpler and more efficient, a integer that is a power 
of 2 should be selected. This allows for x bits to be selected for each hash 
function where m = 2x, and makes having uniform bit selection from the hash 
functions easier to achieve. For this example let m = 1024, this is the power of 
two above the m necessary for the false positive rate and will offer a lower false 
positive rate then the desired p of .01, while letting m = 512, the next closest 
power, would have a false positive rate of greater than .01 when 100 entries 
were added. Now that m is selected and optimal k can be selected using m and n 
as follows. 
 
  
       
 
 
          
   
        
(3.4.2) 
 
The optimal value of k is 7.0979, but it is not possible to have only a part of a 
hash function or select part of a bit, therefore an integer value must be selected 
for k. Since 7.0979 is between 7 or 8, we can test both of these to see which one 
is likely to have a lower false positive rate using our value of “m” and “n”. 
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(3.4.3) 
 
The value of k should be selected as 7 since this produces a lower false positive 
rate, also using less hash functions will improve the speed of both Bloom filter 
entry additions, and access checks. 
 Now that the parameters have been selected entries can be added, to the 
dual Bloom filter structure. The following <role, operation> pairs were added to 
the dual Bloom filters.  The first number is the role id, second is the hex data 
that represents the operation to be performed. The last value is a yes or no 
representing whether the packet should be challenged and therefore added to 
both filters. 
TABLE 3.4.1 Example <Role, Modbus Packet> Entries 
Role Operation Needs Challenge 
1 01020000000C780F No 
2 01020000000C780F No 
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1 010F0000000401003E96 Yes 
1 010F000000040101FF56 Yes 
1 010F000000040102BF57 Yes 
1 010F0000000401037E97 Yes 
1 010F0000000401043F55 Yes 
1 010F000000040105FE95 Yes 
1 010F000000040106BE94 Yes 
1 010F0000000401077F54 Yes 
1 010F0000000401083F50 Yes 
1 010F000000040109FE90 Yes 
1 010F00000004010ABE91 Yes 
1 010F00000004010B7F51 Yes 
1 010F00000004010C3E93 Yes 
1 010F00000004010DFF53 Yes 
1 010F00000004010EBF52 Yes 
1 010F00000004010F7E92 Yes 
 
After creating a Bloom filter is it’s possible to more accurately determine its false 
positive rate. We have added 18 entries therefore n = 18. Using the previously 
derived equations for p given m, n, and k, the false positive rate of the Bloom 
filter can be shown as: 
 
 
36 
 
 
  (  (  
 
    
)
    
)
 
             
(3.4.4) 
 
However this is merely the theoretical false positive rate of the approximation of 
the Bloom filter after 18 entries. Once we have actually created the Bloom filter 
the number of ones in the Bloom filter can be used to calculate the actual false 
positive rate of this specific Bloom filter. This is done by counting the number of 
bits in this Bloom filter that have been set to 1. This Bloom Filter is shown in the 
following byte array of hex values: 
{ 0xc0, 0x41, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x28, 0x28, 0x04, 0x80, 0x14, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x92, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x80, 0x00, 0x20, 0x04, 0x08, 0x02, 0x44, 0x22, 0x08, 
0x08, 0x04, 0x00, 0x08, 0x05, 0x04, 0x00, 0x80, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x04, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 
0x01, 0x81, 0x40, 0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x40, 0x08, 
0x12, 0x00, 0x29, 0x18, 0x00, 0x08, 0x0b, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 
0x11, 0x00, 0x20, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x24, 0x60, 0x08, 0x06, 0x40, 0x00, 
0x09, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x20, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, 0x00, 0x08, 
0x01, 0x4a, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x08, 0x48, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x42, 0x06, 
0x00, 0x04, 0x41, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00 } 
 
This Bloom filter of 1024 bits has 119 bits set to the value of 1. Therefore, the 
probability of any single bit being a 1 is simply 119/1024.  
 
   
   
    
                
(3.4.5) 
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since the number of bits in the second Bloom filter is known as well, the non-
challenged false positive rate can be calculated as well. The non-challenged false 
positive rate is the odds of an attacker performing an operation that should be 
restricted without knowing the authentication secret. In order for a value not to 
be challenged it must be in the first Bloom filter but not in the second Bloom 
filter. Since all the bits in the second Bloom filter are also one in the first Bloom 
filter the only way for the entry not to be challenged is for the entry to require at 
least one of the bits that are only in the first Bloom filter. For this example the 
second bloom filter has 106 bits set to 1. This means that there are 13 bits not 
shared between the Bloom filters. Therefore the non-challenged false positive 
rate can be calculated as: 
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(3.4.6) 
 
As mentioned previously, the second filter could be designed to store the entries 
that do not need to be challenged as opposed to the entries that do need to be 
challenged. In this design, in order for an entry not to be challenged it must be 
in the second Bloom filter. If a value is in the second Bloom filter then it will also 
be in the first Bloom filter since all the ones in the second Bloom filter will be set 
in the first Bloom filter. Therefore this value can be calculated in the same way 
that the false positive rate for the original Bloom filter was. The theoretical value 
can be calculated using the false positive formula, using n=2 since there were 
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two entries that were not challenged:     
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(3.4.7) 
 
Also since this Bloom filter was actually created the number of ones can be 
counted and the actual false positive rate can be calculated.  
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(3.4.8) 
 
For this example the second Bloom filter used for challenge response has a much 
lower false positive rate than the first and therefore should be used if this data is 
used in an actual system. 
3.5. Comparison of the Two Challenge Response Implementations 
In the example above there was a difference in the two false positive rates of 
several orders of magnitude. This section will discuss and prove whether or not 
this is true for all data sets or if there is a cut off where the other implementation 
produces a smaller false positive rate. Start by expanding the formula to include 
an additional variable c; this will represent the number of entries that need to be 
challenged. In the second example above, operations that were in the Access 
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Bloom filter but were not in the challenge response Bloom filter were challenged.  
In this case, the false positive rate of non-challenged packets is the false positive 
rate of the challenge response Bloom Filter.  This Bloom filter will have n - c 
entries therefore: 
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(3.5.1) 
 
For this example the value of k will be assumed to be the optimal value based on 
the access Bloom filter therefore: 
 
  
       
 
 
(3.5.2) 
 
This allows the formula for p to be written as 
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(3.5.3) 
 
The second Bloom filter strategy for deciding challenges, the first one 
implemented in the prior example, involves both Bloom filters. The first Bloom 
filter of containing n entries and the second Bloom filter containing c entries. In 
order for a non-challenged false positive to occur at least one bit must be in the 
first Bloom filter that is not in the second Bloom filter. In order to calculate this it 
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is necessary to determine the number of bits that are one in the first Bloom filter 
that are not in the second Bloom filter.   
First assume that c identical entries have been added to both Bloom filters. This 
means there are n - c entries to add to the first Bloom filter. The theoretical 
number of ones that is added to this filter when c entries already exist will be the 
number of ones in one filter but not in the other. The number of ones after n 
entries will be equal to: 
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(3.5.4) 
 
And after c entries it will be: 
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(3.5.5) 
 
Therefore formula 3.5.6 will calculate the number of ones not shared by the 
Bloom filters 
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Using this, the false positive rate of non-challenged entries can be calculated by 
using the optimal value of k using the following formula:  
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(3.5.7) 
 
This formula uses the theoretical false positive rate for a bloom filter using k-1 
hash functions and size m, with n entries, multiplied by the difference in the 
number of ones calculated previously over m. 
To simplify the comparison of the two formulas the value of m that is based on n 
and the desired false positive rate can be used.  This leaves the two formulas: 
Non-Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter 
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(3.5.8) 
 
Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter 
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 ) (3.5.9) 
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From these two formulas it can be noted that the false positive rate is dependent 
on the ratio between c and n, let this ratio be equal to r. 
Non-Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter 
 
        
    
 
     
        
 
          
      
(3.5.10) 
 
Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter 
          
    ) (3.5.11) 
 
These two equations will always intersect minimally at r=0 and r=1, which 
produce false positive rates of p and 0 respectively. For a realistic example, p will 
be selected to be very small, p << 1, so as p gets smaller and smaller the false 
positive rates of the non-challenge method decreases exponentially while the 
challenge Bloom filter only decreases linearly. This means that the non-challenge 
Bloom filter will have a smaller false positive rate for any small value of p. Figure 
3.5.1 is a plot showing that when p = .001, the non-challenge Bloom filter 
method produces a lower false positive rate for all r values. 
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FIGURE 3.5.1 Comparison of false positive rates of Challenge and Non-Challenge 
Implementations with p = .001 
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FIGURE 3.5.2 Comparison of false positive rates of Challenge and Non-Challenge 
Implementations with r = .75 
 
Shown in figure 3.5.2 is a comparison of the non-challenged false positive 
rates for the two implementation methods for a ratio between challenged 
operations and total operations of .75.  From here it can be seen that as the 
false positive rate of the access Bloom filter decreases the filter containing non-
challenged operations decreases very rapidly, while the filter containing 
challenged operations only decreases linearly and is much greater than the non-
challenged method. 
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Therefore if we select the non-challenge method for the second Bloom 
filter the false positive rate, which is the odds of a potential attack packet making 
it through the Bloom filter, is equal to  
 
        
    
 
     
        
 
          
      
(3.6.10) 
 
where p is the desired false positive rate selected when creating the access 
Bloom filter and r is the ratio of challenged entries to all entries entered into the 
Bloom filter. 
Now that the second filter contains <role, operation> pairs not to 
challenge, instead of pairs to challenge, the flow of the method that determines 
whether to allow, reject, or challenge an operation must be changed slightly. The 
following table, similar to the one shown previously 3.4.1 shows what to do 
when a pair is in or is not in each of the Bloom filters. Since the second filter still 
determines whether or not to challenge an operation, it is still listed as the 
challenge Bloom filter. 
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TABLE 3.5.1 Updated RBAC Responses 
Access Bloom Filter  Challenge Bloom Filter  
Yes Yes Allow 
Yes No Challenge 
No Yes Reject 
No No Reject 
 
Once again it is not possible for an operation to be in the Challenge Bloom filter 
and not the Access one, since the Challenge Bloom filter contains a set of 
elements that is a subset of the ones in the Access filter. This change to the 
table forces the implementation to change slightly as well. The flow diagram for 
implementation of the updated RBAC policy is shown below.  
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Bloom Filter Check Loop
Check Access Bloom Filter
Check Requires Challenge Bloom Filter
Get Bit Position From Hash
[index less than K] 
Set ret to Allow Packet Passthrough
Return Packet Not Valid
[no] 
Set ret to Challenge
[no] 
Increment Index
Return ret
Hash <Role, Operation> using Hash k
[yes] 
 
FIGURE 3.5.3 Updated Flow Diagram for RBAC check 
In the next chapter the implementation and testing of this RBAC and challenge 
response policy for SCADA security will be discussed. 
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4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIELD DEVICE SECURITY PRE-PROCESSOR FOR 
SCADA USING DUAL BLOOM FILTERS FOR ACCESS CONTROL 
4.1. The Field Device Security Pre-Processor 
The field device security preprocessor is a device being developed at the 
University of Louisville for the National Institute for Hometown Security (NIHS). 
It expands upon previously developed technologies developed at the University 
of Louisville for hardening legacy remote terminal units against cyber-attacks for 
HIHS [1], [4], [20]. The device will act as an add-on to existing legacy remote 
terminal units and can be added to existing industrial control systems with 
minimal hardware and software changes. Adding the field device security 
preprocessor (FD-SPP) to an existing unit such as a legacy remote terminal unit 
is performed by disconnecting the existing network connection from the remote 
terminal unit and connecting it instead to the master side of the field device, and 
then creating a connection between the remote terminal unit(RTU) and the slave 
side of the field device. This way the all the traffic that normally would be 
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received by the RTU is now received instead by the FD-SPP. The FD-SPP adds 
support for new security features such as authentication, and role based access 
control to the existing terminal units, however the FD-SPP requires the master 
side of the system to support this mechanism as well. This can be done via a 
software upgrade on the HMI/MTU or with another hardware device similar to 
the FD-SPP. 
Master Terminal Unitt r r i l it
Legacy Field Device i l  i
Process 
Equipment
Communication 
Network
Hardware or 
software 
support for
FD-SPP
FD-SPP
 
FIGURE 4.1.1 Placement of the FD-SPP in a simple SCADA system 
 
Traditional industrial control systems or SCADA systems, do not provide 
any authentication or authorization[5], the FD-SPP will add these features to 
existing control systems. As described in the previous chapter these techniques 
will be implemented using the dual Bloom filter access control, which challenge 
response, and the extended Modbus protocol.  
4.2. The Microkernel Architecture for the FD-SPP 
The microkernel architecture described by Hieb and Graham [1], [4] 
isolates software components into isolated address spaces, separating 
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networking device drivers, security enforcing software components, and field 
equipment interfaces and drivers.  The microkernel enforces these isolations as 
well as provides limited communication channels between particular modules. 
The module containing the networking device drivers and the module containing 
the field device drivers or resources should be completely isolated from each 
other.  These two modules should only communicate to the security modules 
creating a barrier between the input and output of the security device[1]. This 
barrier prevents attackers from leveraging an error in the communication driver 
to affect the field device [4]. The operating system possesses a critical role in 
security enforcement; a microkernel is used by the architecture to minimize the 
amount of code in the trusted computing base.  The microkernel provides only 
the minimum necessary operations including memory abstraction (an address 
space), an execution abstraction (threads), and inter process communication 
(IPC) [1]. The microkernel must provide strong assurance that interaction 
between two address spaces is not possible, and that IPC is limited to specified 
threads only. [1]  
The FD-SPP uses this microkernel based architecture to insure security 
and reliability, in order to achieve this architecture the OKL4 microkernel was 
selected.  OKL4 is a member of the L4 family of operating systems. The L4 
operating systems are second generation microkernel operating systems. OKL4 
like all L4 kernels only provides the most basic essentials required for an 
operating system[21] and leaves the remainder of the design up to the 
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developers. Another L4 operating system seL4 has been formally verified[22]. 
This means that there is a machine checked mathematical proof that the 
implementation in code of seL4 matches the code specifications. It also means 
that seL4 code is proven to be free from common programming errors such as 
buffer overflows and null pointer accesses[22]. Although this doesn’t imply 
security, it is a starting point for building secure software. Additionally this allows 
the software above the kernel to be verified since the kernel is verified. OKL4 is 
in the same family of operating systems as seL4, the verified distribution of L4, it 
should be therefore a small step to make a port from the OKL4 to the verified 
kernel. 
OKL4 allows the division of software above the kernel layer into cells. 
These cells each have their own virtual memory and are segregated from the 
other cells [21]. A buffer overflow in cell A cannot affect cell B. Communication 
between the cells is provided via IPC in the kernel layer. Additionally, like all 
microkernels, device driver level code is in the user application layer. This means 
that cells can have access to the hardware. However to prevent this from being a 
security issue only one cell can have write access to any given register. Cells can 
however share read access to a register [20]. All memory operations including 
access to hardware registers are performed using a virtual memory system 
provided by the OKL4 microkernel, the system calls required to access this virtual 
memory system were developed by Brad Luyster [20]. 
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4.3. The OKL4 Cell Structure used for the FD-SPP 
The FD-SPP software components are broken up into three cells: master 
Modbus communication cell, packet filtering security cell, and the slave Modbus 
communication cell. Each cell has its own responsibilities, and its own memory 
space. This design allows communication handling code and security code to be 
run in completely separate memory spaces, and creates a separation between 
the code communicating with the master and slave devices. Shown below is the 
model of the OKL4 cells for the FD-SPP. 
Master Modbus
Communication
Cell
Packet Filtering 
Security Cell
Slave Modbus
Communication
Cell
OKL4
 
FIGURE 4.3.1 OKL4 cells for the FD-SPP 
The master Modbus communication cell is responsible for receiving and 
sending data to the Modbus master which in this case is the virtual Modbus serial 
device. This cell has a driver for one of the UARTs on the device, which allows it 
to communicate over RS-232 with the master. The master then scans the data 
received by the UART until it finds a valid Modbus packet. This packet is then 
sent to the packet filtering security cell via IPC. Since the master Modbus 
communication cell only sends valid packets to the packet filtering security cell, 
the packet filtering security cell is protected from attacks using invalid packets. 
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The packet filtering security cell can also send packets to the master Modbus 
communication cell which is responsible for forwarding these packets to the 
master. 
The slave Modbus communication cell has very similar operations with the 
master Modbus communication cell. Additionally the code for the two cells is 
almost identical. The slave Modbus communication cell sends and receives data 
via RS-232 with the slave (RTU). When it receives data it automatically forwards 
the data to the security cell which then passes it through to the master. 
Therefore there is no filtering of data for packets being transferred from the 
slave to the master. Additionally the slave Modbus communication cell will get 
packets from the packet filtering security cell which it will be responsible for 
transmitting to the RTU.  
The packet filtering security cell has several functions. Its most simple 
function is forwarding packets from the slave to the master. When the cell 
receives and IPC call from the slave it simply forwards this IPC call to the master. 
The primary task of the security cell is extracting the added security pieces out of 
the extended Modbus packets, and only sending packets that are verified to the 
Slave. This involves several tasks: creating and managing user connections, 
creating and validating challenge response packets, and performing role based 
access control for each packet and each user as defined in the previous chapter. 
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The OKL4 software was divided into three cells, which all have their own 
memory space which they can read/write and none of the other cells can access. 
In order for these cells to send data to each other they use IPC calls, provided by 
the microkernel. All IPC communication channels must be defined at compile 
time and cannot be changed during run time. This means that if there are no IPC 
communications channels defined between to cells they cannot directly 
communicate [20]. Shown below is the layout of the three cells as was shown 
previously, however now the threads and IPC calls of the system have been 
added. 
 
OKL4
Modbus Security 
Filter
Read Master Serial
Write Master Serial
Write Slave Serial
Read Slave SerialPass-through Filter
 
FIGURE 4.3.2 Cell Communication Flow 
The most important concept is that the master communication cell and 
slave communication cell do not have any communication between them. This 
means that in order for a packet to be sent to the RTU it must be passed 
through two layers of IPC and two layers of validation checks. Do to the nature 
of OKL4 a bug in one of these layers cannot exploit the next layer this makes it 
very difficult for an attack packet to propagate through the OKL4 security device. 
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4.4. Software Design of OKL4 Cells 
The slave Modbus communication cell and the master Modbus 
communication cell share much of the same source code and are almost 
identical. They both perform the operation of reading and writing to an RS-232 
communication port. The STUART (Standard UART) is used for the master 
communications, and the BTUART (Bluetooth UART) is used for the slave 
communications. The BTUART although it is capable of being used as a 
Bluetooth device port is being used in the same way the STUART is as a 
standard RS-232 communications port [23]. Both the master and slave 
communication cells are broken up into two threads; One thread for polling the 
UART and forming Modbus packets to send to the filtering cell and a second for 
writing packets to the UART as they are received from the filtering cell. Shown 
below is the flow diagram for the read data from UART thread. 
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Wait for Clock Ready IPC
Get Packet From UART
Setup UART
Send Packet to Filter
 
FIGURE 4.4.1 UART read flow chart 
The first block on the diagram is a wait for the clocks to be set up for the 
UART. This is because only one cell is allowed write access to enable the clocks 
for the UART. The master communications cell sets up the UART clocks for itself 
and the slave communication cell. Once the thread is notified that the clocks are 
set up, it sets up its initialization parameters for the UART such as baud rate and 
flow control. After this it begins the process of gathering data from the UART and 
sending it to the filter cell. Each communication cell begins filling a buffer with 
data and waiting for the 3.5 character times between bytes, which represents 
the end of packet in the Modbus standard [24]. Once this 3.5 character times 
occurs the communication cell performs a Modbus CRC check on the packet. If 
the CRC check matches the packet CRC then this packet is valid and therefore 
sent to the filter, otherwise the beginning and ending point of the packet are 
marked in the buffer and the communication cell waits for the next packet. The 
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communication cell additionally uses a circular buffer, in other words if the end 
of the buffer has been reached the bytes are added to the beginning of the 
buffer. The diagram below shows what the buffer looks like after the first packet 
is read in. 
 
FIGURE 4.4.2 Communication Cell Circular Buffer 
When the second packet is read in its data is placed after the first packet. 
The same CRC check is performed on this next packet to see if it is a valid 
Modbus packet. If so the packet is sent to the filtering cell. Whenever a valid 
packet is found and passed to the filtering cell, the buffer is cleared. This 
prevents unnecessary CRC checks with invalid data. The diagram below shows 
where the second packet is placed in the buffer. 
 
FIGURE 4.4.3 Master Cell second Modbus placement in circular buffer 
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If the data in the second packet is invalid, the two packets are looked at 
as a single packet. If this reconstructed packet is valid then it is passed on to the 
filtering cell. The diagram below shows the reconstructed packet. 
 
FIGURE 4.4.4 Modbus message reconstruction 
If this packet is not valid then the process continues for the third packet. 
First the packet is checked by itself. If this fails it is checked in combination with 
the second packet. If this fails all three packets are combined and checked. This 
process is continued with a fourth, fifth or sixth packet. If a seventh packet is 
received the first packet is dropped so the system will never remember more 
than six packets. This packet reconstruction is necessary to guarantee valid 
Modbus packets are sent to the filtering cell from the communication cell.  
Due to overhead created by the operating system there was no way to 
guarantee that the 3.5 character was enough to signify the end of a packet as in 
the Modbus. The 3.5 character times were used to segment groups of bytes 
received by the RS-232 port. These groups were then checked to see if they 
contained a complete Modbus packet with valid checksum. Using a wired 
connection a small number of packets were split in two and needed this 
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reconstruction. When the communication was switched to wireless serial the 
packets were often split into 2 and sometimes more pieces, it was during the 
testing over the wireless lines it became apparent a mechanism was needed to 
reconstruct these packets to recreate the robustness that is required by SCADA 
systems.  
The write data to UART thread is the same for both the Master and Slave 
with the only exception being they are writing to different UARTs. The Diagram 
below shows the flow of the write data to UART thread. 
Wait for IPC
Write buffer to UART
Read IPC to Buffer
 
FIGURE 4.4.5 Flow in the UART write thread 
The operations of this thread are fairly simple. Wait for a message from 
the filter then write that data to the UART.  
Like the communication cells, which have two threads each the filtering 
cell also has two threads one for managing traffic from the slave to the master 
and one for managing traffic from the master to the slave. The first thread that 
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manages traffic from the slave to the master is very simple. All it does is wait for 
packets from the slave cell then forward them to the Master cell. This thread is 
mostly needed to create isolation between the Master and Slave communication 
cells. 
The thread that filters data from the master cell to the slave cell is much 
more complex. This cell is responsible for setting up communications with a user, 
performing role based access control, and validating packets via challenge 
response. This section will provide an overview of these operations but more 
details can be found in chapter 3.  
Like all the threads in this system the general idea for this thread is wait 
for packet, perform operation, wait for next packet. So first the system waits for 
a packet from the Master cell. After receiving the packet, the packet is checked 
to see if a challenge or connection request is required before allowing this packet 
to pass through. If a connection request is required the filtering cell sends a 
connection request back to the master cell which forwards the packet to the 
master (HMI). Likewise, if a challenge is required, a challenge is sent to the 
master cell which forwards the packet to the Master (MHI). Otherwise the packet 
is rejected entirely or allowed through to the slave cell which forwards the packet 
to the slave device. The diagram below shows the summary view of the flow of 
the filtering cell.  
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ReceivePacket Check CRC
Challenge Response
Check Requires Challenge
[CRC is Valid] 
Wait For Packet
Send Packet to Slave
Send Connection RequestReject Packet
[Challenge Required] 
[Allow Packet Passthrough] 
[Connection Not Established] 
[Packet Not Authenticated] 
[Packet Authenticated] 
[Response Packet Function Code Incorrect] 
 
FIGURE 4.4.6 Flow of a packet through the filtering cell 
The check requires challenge function plays a vital role in determining 
what happens to each packet. Show in figure 4.4.7 is a diagram that shows how 
the outcome of for each packet is formed. 
Save RTU Address Check Connection Request Save User Id
Return Connection Required
Return Challenge Required
[yes] 
[User Id Invalid] 
Check Connection Status
Check if Administator
[connected] [yes] 
Check Bloom Filter Entries
Return Bloom Filter Result
 
FIGURE 4.4.7 Modbus packet determination flow 
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The diagrams both show a very high level view of the operations of the 
filtering cell, to see more details see the challenge response and role based 
access control section below that specifies the detailed implementation of each 
of these functions. 
4.5. Implementation of the Dual Bloom Filters for RBAC 
 As described in chapter 3, dual Bloom filters were created for the role 
based access control for the field device security preprocessor, in order to create 
the optimal Bloom filter, it must be known previously how much data, or in this 
case how many packets are going to be stored in the Bloom filter. In order to do 
this for an existing system the packets can simply be watched. A listener with a 
similar architecture to the FD-SPP can instead of filtering packets output them to 
a program that simple records them. It must also be known which user must be 
allowed to perform each operation. In order to find all the packets and create the 
Bloom filter in a simple easy to use way the following program was created. The 
recording system works as follows, first a system user is created, as well as a 
role for that system user. Then the user begins using the existing SCADA system 
as they would normally, the program listens to the packets used by the user and 
saves them. It can also be specified whether the operations or some of the 
operations require a challenge. After all the operations for one role, the next user 
can perform all of their operations, and the system can record those. After all the 
operations that the system should perform are recorded along with the users 
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that can perform all those operations the dual Bloom filters containing those 
operations can be created. Shown below is a screenshot of the recording 
software capable of creating the dual Bloom filters for an existing SCADA system.  
 
FIGURE 4.5.1 Bloom Filter Creation Software Screenshot 
The Bloom filters created from this software can simply be placed into the 
field device security preprocessor, which will then use them for RBAC control. In 
this system all the packets must be known before the system is implemented, 
creating the Bloom filters before implementation and creating no method for 
updating them prevents an attacker from changing the role based access control 
policies. Future versions of the FD-SPP may allow for updating but this will not 
be done through a network update. The Bloom filters could be kept in removable 
flash memory, which can be physically swapped out in order to update the RBAC 
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policy. In the current implementation however, the Bloom filters are hard coded 
and updated at compile time.  
4.6. An Example Access Check in the Dual Bloom Filters 
The Bloom filters created by capturing software are checked by the FD-
SPP in order to implement its RBAC. Like described in the previous chapter this is 
done by appending the role of the currently logged in user with each Modbus 
packet received by the FD-SPP and passing it through a variety of hash 
functions. However the FD-SPP only passes the <role, operation> pair into a 
single hash function SHA-256. This 256-bit hash can be broken up into a large 
number of small hash functions. For example suppose Bloom filters of length 
1024 bits are used, for this hash functions that produce 10 bits ( log2(1024) ) are 
required. The single SHA-256 hash can be used to create twenty-five 10-bit hash 
functions. Since SHA-256 is approved by NIST[25], which list random number 
generators as recommended use for its approved hash functions[26], the bits in 
the SHA-256 hash must uncorrelated be completely independent of each 
other[27].  This means that the sub-hash functions (10-bit chunks of the original 
SHA-256 bit hash) can be seen as independent hash functions that are all 
suitable for use for implementation of a Bloom filter. This technique of splitting a 
large hash function into smaller hash functions was also used by Tripunitara and 
Carbunar [16]. In order to ensure correctness are reduce coding time an open 
source c implementation of SHA-256 created by Aaron Gifford[28] and modified 
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by Brad Luyster[20] for compatibility with OKL4 was used to generate the SHA-
256 hashes required by the FD-SPP. 
Assuming that k is selected to be seven, each hash function can be 
created from 10 bits any two bytes of the SHA-256. Figure 4.6.1 shows how 7 
hash functions are created using the first 14 bytes of the SHA-256 Algorithm. 
SHA-256
256 bit Hash
Use the hash in groups 
of two bytes in place of 
k hash functions
Set the bits at each of 
the k positions to 1 M bit bloom filter
Modbus 
Packet
Role Id
 
FIGURE 4.6.1 Using SHA-256 to Add Entries to a Bloom filter 
 
4.7. Reduction of the False Positive Rate 
In order to reduce the false positive rate it is important to understand 
what variables are related to the false positive rate of the Bloom filter. Simply 
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put, if two Bloom filters have the same number of hash functions k, and the 
same number of bits m, then the only thing that can make the false positive rate 
any different is the number of ones. But how could one reduce the number of 
ones for a given Bloom filter without reducing the amount of data stored in the 
filter. Theoretically the number of entries into the Bloom filter is based on the 
number of entries times the number of hash functions minus the number of 
collisions. If the number of collisions is increased the Bloom filter will have a 
lower false positive rate [10]. It is important to note that this does not mean 
getting hash functions which generally create more collisions it means getting 
hash functions that collide for the specific values that are added to the Bloom 
filter. The hash functions must still have uniform results for any arbitrary input 
data otherwise the bias will allow for more false positives not less [10]. 
For example, assume two entries A and B are going to be placed in to a 
Bloom filter that uses 7 hash functions. When they are added they each add 7 
bits to the Bloom filter for a total of 14 bits set. What if we had a list of hash 
functions where we could select the 7 hash functions that had the most 
collisions? First assume we can use the same number of hash functions but now 
there is one collision. This collision results in 13 bits added to the bloom filter 
instead of 14. Since this value is being taken to the k power, even adding a small 
number of collisions can have a large effect on the false positive rate. 
    
   
        
(4.7.1) 
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In this case the adding of a single collision reduced the false positive rate 
to 60% of its former value. Now for a more general case let x be the number of 
entries in the filter and c be the collision percentage that can be invoked, 
therefore (
 
 
)
 
 can be reduced to (
       
 
)
 
. This means that we can reduce the 
false positive rate by         . For example creating a collision rate of 10% 
for the known entries of the Bloom filter reduces the false positive rate by over 
50% when 7 hash functions are used. 
In the example above the challenge response Bloom filter had 7 hash 
functions, 1024 bit length and 14 bits set to one. This produces a false positive 
rate for non-challenged entries of 
 
    
  
    
                
(4.7.2) 
 
Using 74 hash functions to search for collision among the 2 entries, 7 new 
hash functions all with uniform output distributions were able to be selected that 
had 3 collisions for the 2 entries into the challenge response bloom filter. This 
reduces the number of ones from 14 to 11. This creates a collision rate of    
 
  
, which allows for a reduction in the false positive rate of 
 
  (  
 
  
)
 
         
(4.7.3) 
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This allows for over an 80% reduction in the false positive rate using the 
same number of hash functions, entries, and bit length. The new false positive 
rate for non-challenged false positives is 
 
    
  
    
                 
(4.7.4) 
 
Additionally all the hash functions used for this were based on the same 
SHA-256 hash as the previous design was therefore there is no additional cost 
for using these hash partitions as opposed to the original partitions. For example 
pairs of two bytes were taken to create each of the 7 hash functions, however 
only 10 of the 16 bits were needed. Hash functions could be created from any 10 
of these 16 bits, thus creating a number of hash functions that can be easily 
used with nominal cost. 8008 different 10-bit hash functions, with 10 unique bits 
can be selected from the 2 bytes used above to create the sub-hash functions in 
the example above. Since all of the bits of the SHA-256 hash function should be 
uncorrelated and unbiased any 10 bits can be selected to make a 10 bit hash 
function that is suitable for Bloom filters. The hash functions created from the 
SHA-256 hash should not share any bits, to ensure they are not correlated in the 
general since. If the absolute minimum false positive rate is desired, it is possible 
to check the false positive rate of all the Bloom filters that could be created from 
all the allowable combinations of hash functions. Since the design of the FD-SPP 
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requires that the entire set of <role, operation> pairs to known in advance it is 
not unfeasible for this to be done, however this would take a very long time and 
is probably not worth the effort. Figure 4.7.1 shows the probability of each 
possible number of bits being set to “1”, in a 1024 bit Bloom Filter using 7 hash 
functions after 18 entries have been added created by simulating bits being set 
in Bloom Filter 10000000 times. 
 
FIGURE 4.7.1 Probability Distribution of number of ones in the Bloom Filter 
The average number of bits set to “1” for this Bloom filter is 118.6. In 10000000 
runs of the simulation the lowest number of bits set to 1 in any Bloom filter was 
103 out of the 1024, this happened 2 times. It is possible for a Bloom filter of 
this size to have much less bits set to “1”, but the odds of this happening are 
very low since the odds of getting smaller number of bits shrinks exponentially. 
There is only around a 1% chance of getting a value of 112 or less. 112 bits set 
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to “1” corresponds to a false positive rate of 1.87252E-07, which is the around 
two thirds of the average false positive rate for this Bloom filter of 2.7975E-07. 
For this size filter if 100 combinations of hash functions are created and tested 
there is a good chance one set will be found that will have a false positive rate of 
around two thirds of the estimated false positive rate. Searching 10000000 
combinations of hash functions is likely to produce a Bloom filter that has a false 
positive rate of one third of the estimated false positive rate. As can be seen a 
short search can reduce the false positive rate of the Bloom filter, and searching 
for a long time can produce an even larger reduction. It is up to the implementer 
to decide how much time they are willing to use searching for hash functions 
that produce Bloom filters with large number of internal collisions, and thus low 
false positive rates. 
4.8. Prototype of the Field Device Security Preprocessor 
For the purpose of lab testing, a prototype FD-SPP was constructed using the 
previously described design. The prototype was built using the Gumstix® verdex 
pro™ XM4 COM single board computer. The OKL4 software system is designed to 
run on the Marvell® PXA270 with XScale® processor which was the primary 
motivation for choosing the Gumstix® verdex pro™ XM4 COM. The XM4 has 64 
MB of RAM and 16 MB of Flash. Currently the FD-SPP doesn’t use the Flash 
memory and all code is operated in RAM, however this may change in later 
revisions. The entire system uses less than 1 MB of RAM. The system also 
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requires 2 or more serial communication ports, one to connect to the master 
device and one to talk to the slave. These can be added by connecting the 
Gumstix console-vx expansion board. Shown in figure 4.8.1 below is the Gumstix 
and the attached console-vx board that were used to create the prototype for 
the FD-SPP.  
 
FIGURE 4.8.1 Field Device Security Preprocessor Prototype 
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5. TESTING OF THE FIELD DEVICE SECURITY PRE-PROCESSOR 
This section describes testing and refinement of the prototype FD-SPP.  An 
HMI/MTU test harness and a simulation environment were constructed for 
testing purposes.  An actual legacy field device, a Sixnet mIPM RTU, was part of 
the test framework.  The mIPM supports serial communication and the Modbus 
protocol.  The mIPM has 24 IO points, and a simple HMI/MTU was built that 
could, via Modbus, read and write these “coils”.    
5.1. Java Modbus HMI Design 
For this project the Modbus HMI and MTU were integrated into a single Java 
program developed using Netbeans IDE. The software uses the RXTX[29] 
package to communicate via RS232 to the FD-SPP. The program provided typical 
Modbus features such as reading and writing coils, as well as, support for 
security. The HMI provides four toggle buttons, which when pressed send 
Modbus write coils packets to the FD-SPP. The HMI also provides a “read” button 
which sends a Modbus read coils packet to the FD-SPP. Additionally the HMI 
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provides the extended Modbus features required by the FD-SPP. The login 
request packet is sent by pressing the “login button”; this sends a login request 
packet containing the provided user id. The HMI also automatically replies to 
challenge responses using the password that is in the password field.  
The HMI also monitors responses from the FD-SPP. As with most Master-Slave 
protocols when the master sends a message there will always be a response. If 
the HMI does not receive a response to any packet it sends, it will indicate this 
by turning the box next to the words “no reply” red, and force the user to issue a 
new login request. When a valid packet is received the box next to connected 
will turn green to indicate the communication channel between the HMI and FD-
SPP is working properly. If this packet is a response to a read coils command the 
digital input indicators will show which digital inputs are on (red) and which are 
off (gray).  
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FIGURE 5.1.1 Java Modbus HMI 
 
5.2. Initial performance data  
Adding the FD-SPP increases the amount of time it takes for a packet to be sent 
from the master to the slave and from the slave to the master. A command line 
based communications timing program was created in C# to test the timing 
performance of the test SCADA network with and without the field device 
security preprocessor. The timing data below in table 5.2.1, collected by the 
program, shows the increase in time compared to the time without the security 
device in place. Two cases were tested for each, “with security” and “without 
security” implementations. The first case was reading coils. The second was 
writing coils, which included a challenge response for the “with security” 
implementation. For the purpose of this test, and the rest of the tests below, 
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write coils commands are always challenged when the FD-SPP is in place, and 
read coils commands are not challenged.    
Shown below in figure 5.2.1 is the diagram of how challenged Modbus packets 
would propagate through the system. The Timer software replaces the HMI. It 
sends a Modbus packet to either the RTU(to test without security), or the FD-
SPP(to test with security) times how long it takes to receive the Modbus 
response for the sent message, therefore how long it takes the packet to 
propagate through the system, including the challenge response cycle if 
required.  
Virtual Serial Device
OKL4 Modbus Security
Device
RTU
Existing ModbusRTU Control
System
Modbus Command
Modbus Command
Challenge
Challenge Response
Modbus Command
Modbus Response
Modbus Response
Modbus Response
 
FIGURE 5.2.1 Modbus packet propagation 
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TABLE 5.2.1 Initial Timing Data 
 Read Coils Write Coils 
 Without Security With Security Without Security With Security 
Trails 500 500 500 500 
Minimum 116ms 144ms 127ms 257ms 
Median 119ms 163ms 129ms 281ms 
Average 119ms 165ms 129ms 278ms 
Maximum 140ms 207ms 140ms 304ms 
 
This timing data was taken using 9600 baud serial connections. A Similar FD-SPP 
implementation using alternative communication protocol was also tested at a 
later time. Data from this alternative communication showed that packets with 
challenges could propagate through the system in less than 90ms.  
5.3. Modbus compliance testing 
This set of test was written using the Unit Testing Suite built into Visual Studio. 
The Test Suite works in place of the HMI, just like the timer program. Shown in 
figure 5.3.1 is the system diagram for these tests. 
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FIGURE 5.3.1 Compliance testing system diagram 
 
These tests do not test security but test that the system operates as specified to 
when any given packet is encountered. Shown below is the test result output 
which was displayed by Visual Studio.  The following subsections discuss each 
individual test in more detail. 
 
FIGURE 5.3.2 Compliance Checker Output 
 
5.3.1. Test Login Success 
This test checks to make sure that the user login procedure works properly for a 
valid login. First the test sends a login request packet to the OKL4 Modbus 
security device. The test then collects data from the receive port for a small 
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amount of time. This data is then checked to make sure it is a challenge packet. 
The test then sends the proper challenge response to complete the login. Once 
again the test waits to see if the security device response. Since currently there 
is no “login complete packet” the security device should not respond to the 
challenge response. A “login complete packet” may be created for a future 
revision of this system. After the system has verified that device did not send any 
data, it sends a read coils packet to confirm the connection. If the response to 
this packet is not the “Connection Required/Requested Packet” the connection is 
deemed successful.  
5.3.2. Test Login Invalid User 
This test checks to make sure that the user login procedure works properly when 
an invalid user id is sent in the connection request. First this test sends a 
connection request with an invalid user id to the OKL4 Modbus security device. 
Since the user id is invalid the OKL4 Modbus security device responds with a 
“Connection Required/Requested” Packet. The test checks to see if the packet it 
received is a “Connection Required/Requested” Packet, if so the OKL4 Modbus 
Security Device passes this test.  
5.3.3. Test Login Invalid Password 
This test checks to make sure that the user login procedure works properly for a 
login with a valid user but incorrect password. First, the test sends a login 
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request packet to the OKL4 Modbus security device. The test then collects data 
from the receive port for a small amount of time. This data is then checked to 
make sure it is a challenge packet. The test then sends the challenge response 
formed with the incorrect password to complete the login process. Once again 
the test waits to see if the security device responds. Since currently there is no 
“login complete packet” the security device should not respond to the challenge 
response. A “login complete packet” may be created for a future revision of this 
system. After the system has verified that the device did not send any data, it 
sends a Read Coils packet to confirm the connection. If the response to this 
packet is not the “Connection Required Packet” the connection is deemed 
successful. In this case receiving the “Connection Required Packet” is a 
successful run of the test since this would imply that the login was unsuccessful.  
5.3.4. Test Packet RBAC Challenge 
This test is broken up into four separate tests. Each of the tests preforms a login 
with a particular user and then sends a packet. This test is verifying the proper 
response is returned by the RBAC. The three responses tested are: no-challenge, 
challenge, and reject. For this Test it is assumed the following permissions have 
been set up in the bloom filters. User 1 can read and write coils but challenges 
are required on writes. User 2 can read coils only, no challenges are required. 
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 The first test performs a login as user 1, and sends a read coils packet. The 
test then verifies that there is a response to this packet, and that the 
response is a valid read coils response and not a challenge request. 
 The second test performs a login as user 1, and sends a write coil packet. 
The test then verifies that the response to this packet is a challenge request. 
 The third test performs a login as user 2, and sends a read coil packet. The 
test then verifies that the there is a response to this packet, and that the 
response is a valid read coils response and not a challenge request packet. 
 The fourth test performs a login as user 2, and sends a write coil packet. The 
test then verifies that there is no response to this packet, therefore it was 
rejected.  
5.3.5. Test Challenge-Response 
This test is responsible for testing the full challenge response exchange as shown 
in figure 5.2.1. This test first performs a login as user 1 then the sends write 
packets to the RTU which causes a challenge to be made. The proper response is 
then sent to these challenges. The test then waits for the response of this 
challenge. If this response confirms that the coils have been written then the 
challenge response protocol is working properly.  This test also tests improper 
challenge responses to confirm that the proper response is required for a packet 
to propagate to the slave RTU. 
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5.3.6. Test Packet Reconstruction 
This test is responsible for testing the packet reconstruction abilities of the OKL4 
Modbus security device. This test sends packets that have been split by a small 
amount of time, to confirm that the OKL4 Modbus security device is properly 
combining them into a single valid packet. This reconstruction is necessary 
because the separation of bytes into packets is done in software by the OKL4 
Modbus security device and can often not be precise enough to separate packets 
based on the 3.5 character stop time specified in the Modbus protocol standard. 
This test uses unchallenged read commands split in to pieces and verifies that a 
read response was sent in return. The test also sends garbage packets in an 
attempt to trick the OKL4 device. The test makes sure that only consecutives 
packets pieces that combine to a single valid packet are accepted by the device. 
5.3.7. Test RBAC Suspicious Mode 
This test is responsible for making sure the system properly enters and leaves 
suspicious mode. This is performed by creating a user that can only read coils. 
The test logs in as this user, and attempts to write to a coil. Since this operation 
is not allowed by the RBAC this should cause the system to enter suspicious 
mode which cause all packets to be challenged. The test then attempts to read a 
coil. The response of this should be a challenge if not the test fails. If the 
response is a challenge the proper response is sent sending the system back into 
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normal mode. A second read packet can then be sent to verify this transition. If 
the packet is not challenged, the devices has properly reentered normal 
operating mode. Various amounts of read packets are sent after a write packet 
to confirm proper operations of the suspicious mode, and the switching between 
modes.  
5.3.8. Test Write Coils 
Unlike all of the tests above, this test requires a tester to supply input to the test. 
This test logins as a user and begin writing coils. After each write the test pops 
up a dialog asking what the current state of the RTU digital outputs are. The test 
then checks to see if which of the DO on the Sixnet RTU are active, and inputs 
this to the dialog. If the input to this dialog matches the write coils packet that 
was sent to the RTU then the write was a success. Shown below in figure 5.3.3 
is the dialog presented to the tester. 
 
FIGURE 5.3.3 Digital output dialog displayed to Tester 
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5.3.9. Test Read Coils 
This test is responsible for making sure reading coils is working properly. This 
test is very similar to the write coils test; it asks a tester what the current states 
of the digital inputs are the Sixnet RTU are and then performs a read. If these 
two values match then the coils were read properly. It then allows the user to 
change the coils and read again to further confirm the read is working correctly. 
Shown below is the dialog for the read coils test. 
 
FIGURE 5.3.4 Read coils dialog box 
 
5.4. Penetration Testing 
For the purpose of penetration testing two lab setups were conceived. The first 
of which did not have the FD-SPP, and the second did. Shown below are the two 
lab configurations. 
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FIGURE 5.4.1 Penetration testing setup with FD-SPP 
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FIGURE 5.4.2 Penetration testing setup control setup 
 
The attack PC was used to monitor, and inject Modbus packets onto the wireless 
serial connection.  A number of different attacks were carried out.  The different 
attacks and the results are described in the following sections.  Table 5.4.1 
summarizes the results of the penetration testing. 
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TABLE 5.4.1 Penetration testing results. 
Attack Without 
Security 
With 
Security 
With Security and 
Signatures 
Write Coils Success Failed Failed 
Write Random Coils Success Failed Failed 
Read Coils Success Success Success 
HMI Read Attack Success Success Failed 
HMI Write Attack Success Success Failed 
DOS Attack Success Success Success 
 
 
5.4.1. Write Coils Attack 
Since there is no built in security anyone on the network can send a packet. For 
this test a simple write multiple coils command were transmitter onto the 
network. The packet sent on the network (in hex) was 010F000000040105fe95.  
For this attack the FD-SPP protected the RTU from the attack, while without the 
security the attacker was very easily able to write to the coils.  
5.4.2. Write Random Coils Repeatedly Attack 
This attack takes the previous attack one step farther. It sends randomly 
generated write coils attacks very rapidly in an attempt to get the security 
software confused, or in an incorrect state. For this attack the security piece 
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protected the RTU from the attack, while without the security the attacker was 
very easily able to write to the coils. The security piece did not allow any of the 
unauthenticated packets to go through and after the attack was able to return to 
normal operating mode and allow authenticated write coil packets to pass 
through. 
5.4.3. Theoretical Write Coils Attacks 
Since with all security it is not whether or not an attack is possible that matters, 
but a measure of how difficult the attack is to perform, this section will cover the 
theoretical attacks that could be used. This section covers writing coils but can 
apply to any packet that is a challenged packet and in the Bloom filter as such 
for a particular user. There are two mechanisms that control security, and in 
order to defeat the security the attack must exploit at least one of these 
mechanisms.  
The first of which is the challenge response. When a packet, such as a Write 
Coils packet is challenged, the attack could attempt to create the proper 
response packet. Since each challenge contains 4 bytes of nonce the user cannot 
simply apply a replay attack. If the user simply records traffic they can begin to 
accumulate challenge responses. Eventually since there are a finite number of 
nonce values the attacker will eventually be able to perform a replay attack using 
the saved nonce values. A size of four bytes means that the nonce can take the 
form of 4294967296 different bit sequences. However the attacker would not 
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need to see every bit sequence to get a single packet through, using similar 
equations to the Bloom filter ones in chapter two the average amount of packets 
an attacker would have to see before getting a successful replay can be 
calculated by solving equation 5.4.1, where m is the total number of 
combinations, and n is the average number of bit sequences it takes to see a 
single repeated sequence.  
 
 (  (  
 
 
)
 
)      
(5.4.1) 
 
Solving for n numerically using Maple with m = 4294967296, gives n = 
92682.73335. Assuming the attacker gets the best case scenario, seeing the 
same command sent continuously, they will see on average one packet they 
need approximately every 275ms it would take over 7.5 hours for the attacker to 
get a single packet they can replay. However the attacker would probably want a 
much higher number of packets to perform an actual attack. For example for the 
attacker to have a 10% chance of sending a packet and receiving a challenge 
packet they must have seen 10% of the total number of packets that are 
different. Solving equation 5.4.2 for n gives the number of packets that must be 
seen for the attacker to have a 10% chance of getting an attack to succeed.  
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Solving for n numerically with m = 4294967296, gives n = 452519969. Again 
assuming the attacker gets the best case scenario as describe previously it would 
take almost 4 years to get enough packets. Additionally, it is unlikely the same 
user will be sending the same packet over and over on any SCADA system the 
attacker would want to attack. This being showing it is highly unlikely an attacker 
would ever succeed in a replay attack on the FD-SPP.  
The second part of the challenge response the user could attempt to guess is the 
password. The password is stored in 8 bytes, which means there are 2(8*8) 
combinations of passwords. In order to check passwords the attacker would 
have to write coils and use the password on the challenge then check the coils. 
Without being able to see the coils this would be difficult. The other strategy 
would be to try to login as a user using the password. Since there is no 
successful login response the attack would then have to perform another 
operation to verify that the login was successful. Combined either of these 
strategies would take at least 300ms. In order to check all the passwords that 
could be used it would take 1.75*1011 years. Even if only half this time was 
needed (the time on average to find the correct password) the attacker would 
still be searching for a time much greater than their lifetime. Additionally this 
type of attack would also act as DOS on the network and be quickly detected by 
any user attempting to use the system.  
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The second system an attacker could attack is the RBAC Bloom filters. This 
attack is even more unlikely to be successful than the previous attack. This 
attack involves creating a packet that will successfully make it through the non-
challenged Bloom filter. This means the packet would be directly sent to the 
RTU. However most regular Modbus packets are unlikely to be in the non-
challenged Bloom filter and it is most likely that they are checked to make sure 
they are not in this Bloom filter. This means that a special attack packet must be 
crafted to write the coils, or be performed when a user that cannot write coils is 
logged in.  
For the attack to work using a user that cannot write coils a false positive must 
occur whenever that user writes coils, since there are only a small number of 
packets which this can occur they can all be checked to make sure none exist. 
This special packet would contain a Modbus write coils packet as the first part of 
the packet, and then data would be appended to the packet to make it in the 
Bloom filter. The proper CRC would also have to be added to the packet a valid 
Modbus packet. If the packet was able to pass through the Bloom filter and be 
sent to the RTU it would require that the RTU be checking the packets for a CRC 
match byte by byte, or an error occur splitting the write coils packet from the 
rest of the packet to create a successful write.  
This attack is more of a series of unfortunate events more than it is a planned 
Modbus attack. Also since after one failure the RBAC Bloom filters enter 
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suspicious mode, the attacker would only have one attempt before they would 
have to wait for regular traffic to reset the RBAC back to normal mode. This 
attack, like the one above, would also be detected way before the attacker could 
succeed. Since the attack needs a bit error to occur, when the attacker finally 
finds a packet that is a false positive the attack may still not be successful 
because there is a very low probability of getting the exact bit error the attacker 
needs. Without offline access to the Bloom filter, the attack will likely never know 
if they have found a false positive. Therefore the attack success rate will be 
much less than the bloom filter non-challenged false positive rate. Attack packets 
like the ones discussed here were sent at the RTU directly without the security to 
test the likelihood of a this type of bit error occurring; however in the 1000 
packets sent 0 were successful in writing the coils. Therefore it is extremely 
unlikely an attack of this kind could succeed.  
5.4.4. Read Coils Attack 
In the system that was used for testing reading coils was considered non critical. 
The challenge response was not required to read coils. Therefore once a user 
logs in the coils can be read in the same way they would be in a non-secured 
system. In order to attack this system a read coils command was transmitted by 
the attack, the attacker could then read the resulting packet. If the attacker 
wanted to be less obvious about their attacks the attacker could just wait until a 
read coils command is issued by the user then read the results. Since the data is 
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not encrypted, an attacker would be able to perform this second attack even if 
challenge response was applied on issuing the command.  Both with and without 
the FD-SPP this attack was successful.  
5.4.5. Attacks on the HMI 
In current configuration packets going from the HMI to the FD-SPP can be 
challenged; however packets going from the FD-SPP to the HMI are not 
protected. Two attacks on the HMI were performed by injecting traffic to the 
wireless serial connection to the HMI. Both these attacks work on the system 
with and without the security additions.  
5.4.6. Read Coils Attack on HMI 
In this attack the attacker waits for a read coil command to be sent from the 
HMI to the FD-SPP, once the packet is sent the attacker sends a packet to collide 
with the read coils response sent by the FD-SPP. Since the packets collide no 
valid data is received. The attacker then sends their own read coils response 
code. The HMI sees this faked packet as the real read coils response. This allows 
the attacker to make the user think different things are happening in the network 
then what really are. 
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5.4.7. Write Coils Attack on HMI 
In this attack the attacker waits for a write coil command to be sent from the 
HMI to the FD-SPP, once the packet is sent the attacker sends a packet to collide 
with the write coils packet to prevent it from getting to the FD-SPP, if this fails 
making a packet collide with the challenge will perform the same thing. The idea 
is to stop the write coils packet from ever making it to the RTU by any means 
necessary. Once the packet is stopped the attacker can then send a write coils 
response to the serial connection of the HMI. In this way the attacker can make 
the user think they are writing coils when they are not. 
5.5. Digital Signatures for Return Packets 
After penetration testing it was clear a second layer of security was needed. An 
attacker was able to trick the HMI into thinking they were the RTU. In order to 
prevent this attack a digital signature was added to each return packet sent from 
the FD-SPP to the HMI.  
5.5.1. Creation of the Digitally Signed Messages 
The digital signature is created the same way the challenge response hashes are. 
They are created by hashing the Modbus packet without the CRC, with 4 bytes of 
nonce, with the 8 byte pre-shared secret using the SHA-256 hash algorithm. 
 
 
93 
 
SHA-256 Hash
Modbus Packet Without CRC Preshared SecretNonce
8-Byte Signature
 
FIGURE 5.5.1 Return Packet Digital Signature 
 
The digital signature is then appended to the Modbus Packet without CRC. A 
Modbus CRC for this new combined packet is then appended to the end to create 
a valid Modbus Packet. Using a signature instead of a challenge-response 
reduced the overhead created by the extra message passing that is required for 
a challenge-response. This way the only time that is added to the process is the 
time it takes to sign the packet and a small increase in packet propagation 
through the network since packet sizes are increased by 8 bytes.  
 
5.5.2. Timing Data for Signed Packets 
Shown in Table 5.5.1 is the table for packet propagation times after the addition 
of the packet signing routines. 
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TABLE 5.5.1 Timing data for return message digital signatures 
 Read 
Coils 
Write 
Coils Trails 50 50 
Minimum 169ms 288ms 
Median 192ms 304ms 
Average 189ms 307ms 
Maximum 201ms 325ms 
 
Comparing this table to the original time data reveals that adding the Digital 
Signature only adds a few milliseconds. Since the difference between reading 
and writing coils is a challenge response, it can be seen that the challenge 
response adds a lot more time than the digital signature.  
5.5.3. Nonce Generation for the Signature 
Since the Nonce is typically generated by a random number generator and sent 
in the challenge, the removal of this challenge presents a problem with nonce 
generation. It is important that the nonce be different on each message sent in 
order to prevent replay attacks. Additionally this nonce cannot be sent in the 
message because then the attacker could choose what nonce to send therefore 
allowing an opportunity for a replay attack.  
The nonce therefore must be different each time it is generated and able to be 
predicted by both the sender and the receiver of the message. In order to 
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achieve this, a pseudo random number generator was created to serve the 
nonce. The 32-bit (4 bytes) pseudo random number generator was creating 
using two independent 16-bit random number generators. The first was a linear 
congruential generator with period of 53124 and the second was a linear 
feedback shift register with period 65535 [30]. Together these pseudo random 
number generators combine to create a single 32 bit pseudo random number 
generator with a period of 1160493780. Additionally the pseudo random number 
generator is reseeded by a separate random number generator which adds 
entropy from a counter on the FD-SPP during every challenge and a separate 
random on the HMI during every challenge response. Since it is highly unlikely 
that 1160493780 packets in a row will be unchallenged it is likely that entropy 
will be added before the pseudo random generator repeats, and the nonce 
values for the digital signature should be random enough to ensure a high 
amount of protection from replay attacks. 
Each time a nonce value was required to create a digital signature the last used 
nonce values are used as seeds to the generator. Since both systems know the 
old nonce values and have the same generator they will get the same new nonce 
values without have to communicate them. This allows for a shared source of 
nonce without having to communicate the nonce, and prevents replay attacks.  
In order to inject more randomness into the nonce the nonce values from the 
challenge response will also be used. When a challenge response generates new 
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random nonce both systems will set this as their old nonce to be used as a seed 
the next time they sign a packet. Two of these bytes will come from the 4 nonce 
bytes sent in the challenge and another two bytes are included in the response 
packet. This way both systems create and control the nonce. This prevents an 
attacker from being able to choose all the nonce values, and then perform replay 
attacks. With the addition of the digital signatures and the new nonce creation, 
the attacker can no longer perform either of the previously discussed HMI 
Attacks on the system. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis has provided the details of the design and development of a 
Bloom filter authentication module field device security preprocesser as a 
security solution for legacy SCADA field device based on the previous work of 
Hieb and Graham [1]. This device provides several missing security features to 
legacy SCADA field devices using the Modbus protocol, and could easily be 
adapted for other SCADA protocols. The field device uses a micro-kernel 
operating system called OKL4, which allows for a high level of security by 
abstracting memory and execution spaces. The security features implemented on 
the field device include role based access control and challenge response. The 
focus of this thesis has been the design, implementation, analysis of these 
security features using Bloom filters.  
6.1. Results Summary 
Although Bloom filters have false positive authentication it was shown 
through analysis as well as penetration testing that this structure is acceptable 
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for many security applications. Additionally it was shown that by increasing the 
space used to store the Bloom filter and by finding hash functions that produce 
high internal collision rates for the given data set, the false positive rate can be 
reduced to the point where it is more than or as secure as an n-bit symmetric 
encryption key.  
Through performance testing it was shown that the propagation delay 
added by inserting a field device security pre-process around 275ms which is an 
acceptable level for use in the Department of Homeland Security Water Sector. 
The dual Bloom filter structure allows for role based access checks to be 
performed at a very high speed, only costing around 18µs, lowering the 
overhead cost of the FD-SPP on the SCADA network.  
6.2. Direction for Future Work 
The future work for the field device security preprocessor can go a 
number of directions. One direction is to add support for more protocols and 
interfaces. Modbus is not the only SCADA protocol being used in industry and in 
order to protect legacy systems, the protocols that are being used by these 
systems must be supported. Also, RS-232 is not the only interface SCADA 
systems are using. Modbus even has its own protocol for communicating over 
TCP/IP. In order to support these SCADA networks, this interface must be 
supported by the FD-SPP. Additionally the FD-SPP could act as an adapter that 
changes the interface from RS-232 to Ethernet or vice versa. The cell structure 
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of FD-SPP makes adding new protocols and changing interfaces very easy; once 
cells are created they can be simply swapped in and out to create new variants 
of the FD-SPP. Preliminary testing shows that, as expected, a FD-SPP using 
TCP/IP is a lot faster than one using serial communication, and the overhead 
created by the FD-SPP is much smaller. 
The OKL4 micro-kernel operating system has a close relative known as 
seL4, which has been formally verified [22]. Future development will need to 
consider porting this software to the verified kernel. Once the software is running 
on seL4, the software itself must be verified. Possibly, in a similar manner to 
seL4 using machine assisted and machine checked formal proof [22]. Although 
verification does not guarantee that the FD-SPP is secure, it would confirm that 
the software behaves completely as specified and any exploits would be of the 
design, not software bugs. A verified version of the FD-SPP could go a long way 
to reduce the vulnerabilities of legacy systems. 
An alternative to verifying the FD-SPP software running on seL4 would be 
to implement it on a FPGA and verify the VHDL code. Verification should be 
much easier since there has been some prior research into the formal verification 
of VHDL[31]. The software only has a few simple parts and could be 
implemented on an FPGA with little difficulty. The Bloom Filter does not require 
complex software other than the SHA-256 hash. Since it is known that SHA-256 
can be implemented on a FPGA, it should be a small step to implement the dual 
Bloom filter on a FPGA. Additionally, the challenge response routine also uses 
 
 
100 
 
SHA-256 and a small state machine; these two should be possible to implement 
on a FPGA. By implementing the FD-SPP in hardware, it can be made faster than 
using the general purpose hardware, further reducing the overhead added to the 
network.  
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